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Federal law has long prohibited not just intentional discrimination by
employers, but also practices that have an unintentional disparate impact on
minorities. A cryptic passage at the end of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Ricci v. DeStefano may signal a sea change for this disparate-
impact doctrine. Ricci, a lawsuit about a civil-service exam for firefighters,
received widespread attention as a case about intentional discrimination. We
show that the opinion also can be read to suggest a new affirmative defense for
employers facing claims of disparate impact. Before Ricci, disparate impact
was a purely no-fault doctrine. An employer was liable if its employment
practice had an unlawful disparate impact, even if the employer did not know
about the impact or did not intend to subject its employees to an unlawful
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practice. The focus of litigation was not on the employer's state of mind, but
rather on the aspects of the employment practice. If the defense suggested by a
careful reading of Ricci is taken seriously, however, a broad category of
disparate-impact cases may turn on what the employer knew when it took the
challenged action. If the employer uncovered no reason to think that the
practice would have an unlawful disparate impact, it may be immune from
liability for its past actions.
This would be a dramatic development, and if accepted it would open up an
entirely new direction for this area of law. This Article parses the language of
Ricci to show how it points to the new affirmative defense. We explain the
significance such a defense would have for employers, employees, and
disparate-impact theory more generally. We also examine and critique
alternative readings of Ricci that do not entail the new defense discussed here.
Ultimately, we conclude that while Ricci may foreshadow a new view of
disparate impact, the Supreme Court's confusing decision can be given
varying interpretations that will take further litigation to sort out.
What you're saying is that the department can engage in intentional
discrimination to avoid concern that they will be sued under disparate
impact. Why doesn't it work the other way around as well? Why don't
they say, well, we've got to tolerate the disparate impact because
otherwise, if we took steps to avoid it, we would be sued for intentional
discrimination? This idea that there is this great dilemma - I mean, it cuts
both ways.
- Chief Justice John Roberts'
INTRODUCTION
For nearly forty years, there have been two basic kinds of employment-
discrimination claims: disparate-treatment and disparate-impact. Ricci v.
DeStefano,2 one of 2009's most-discussed Supreme Court decisions, was a
disparate-treatment case,3 and it may take years to sort out all of the decision's
repercussions for claims of intentional employment discrimination. But a
careful analysis of the case reveals that it may also have sweeping
consequences for claims of unintentional - or disparate-impact -
discrimination. This Article examines the contours of the new approach to
disparate impact suggested by Ricci and considers whether courts should take
it seriously.
I Transcript of Oral Argument at 28-29, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (No.
07-1428), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument-transcripts/
07-1428.pdf.
2 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
3 Id. at 2673.
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In Ricci, a group of white and Hispanic firefighters sued the City of New
Haven, Connecticut for failing to certify the results of an examination given to
determine who should be promoted to several open lieutenant and captain
positions.4 The City had refused to certify the test results for fear of being
sued by minority firefighters who had failed the exam in disproportionately
high numbers.5  The case attracted widespread attention because of the
application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to these so-called
reverse discrimination claims.6 The Court issued the decision in the midst of
now-Justice Sotomayor's confirmation hearings, and it became a catalyst for
criticism of the nominee as she had been a member of the Second Circuit panel
that issued the decision vacated by the Supreme Court.7
In Ricci, a closely divided Supreme Court concluded that an employer's
"fear of litigation" for unintentional (disparate-impact) discrimination does not
give it an absolute defense to a claim of intentional (disparate-treatment)
discrimination. Rather, the employer has such a defense only where it has a
strong basis in evidence to believe that it will be subject to disparate-impact
liability. Thus, the Supreme Court recognized a limited defense for employers
administering performance examinations that face disparate-treatment suits.8
Legal scholars have already written about this defense as well as the potential
conflict - highlighted by Justice Scalia's concurring opinion - between
disparate-impact claims and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.9
But as this Article explains, a cryptic passage at the end of the Ricci
majority's opinion also hints at a sweeping new affirmative defense for
unintentional, disparate-impact claims brought under Title VII.10 The Court
suggests that employers may have immunity from unintentional discrimination
4 Id. at 2664.
s Id.
6 See Joan Biskupic, Firefighter Case May Keep Sotomayor in Hot Seat: How She
Viewed 'Reverse Bias' Has Critics' Attention, USA TODAY, June 1, 2009, at 2A.
Id.; see also John Christoffersen, 14 Promoted After Court Ruling, DESERET MORNING
NEWS (Salt Lake City), Dec. 11, 2009, at A02; Supreme Countdown: Sotomayor on Verge of
Becoming First Hispanic Justice on High Court, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6, 2009, at 6. The earlier
Second Circuit case was Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev'd,
129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
8 See infra Part II (discussing the holding of the Ricci case).
I See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberley West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: White(ning)
Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73 (2010); Helen Norton, The
Supreme Court's Post-Racial Turn Towards A Zero-Sum Understanding Of Equality, 52
Wm. & MARY L. REV. 197 (2010), Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108
MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010) [hereinafter Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact]; Michael
J. Zimmer, Ricci's "Color-Blind" Standard in a Race Conscious Society: A Case of
Unintended Consequences?, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1529438.
10 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009).
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claims if they were not aware that their actions were discriminatory at the time
they took them."
This portion of the Supreme Court's opinion has largely escaped scholars'
attention to date. When the passage has been mentioned, it has largely been
ignored as unintelligible; one of the leading employment-discrimination
scholars calls it "obtuse" and "inscrutable." 2 This Article seeks to fill this
void in the scholarship, explaining how the Court's language, if taken
seriously, can be translated into a new affirmative defense to claims of
unintentional discrimination.13 Whether this new defense exists and, if it does,
what its contours are will undoubtedly generate contentious litigation for years
to come. This Article lays the groundwork for that debate.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the history of disparate-impact
law, examines the need for this theory as part of employment-discrimination
jurisprudence, and discusses its justifications and codification into Title VII.
Despite its long history, disparate impact's very existence remains
controversial, as demonstrated by the starkly contrasting visions of disparate
impact expressed in the Ricci opinions.14 Part II of this Article examines the
Supreme Court's Ricci case, exploring the Court's justification for - and the
dissent's criticism of - the decision, and addresses critical language at the end
of the majority opinion that suggests a new affirmative defense.
Part III of this Article examines possible narrow interpretations of this
critical concluding language. It explores both a case-specific reading of the
language and an interpretation that views the language simply as nonsensical.
We conclude that neither of these alternatives is completely satisfactory, as
each raises its own difficulties. Part IV of this Article shows that the Supreme
Court's concluding language could instead be read more broadly to suggest a
new affirmative defense to disparate-impact claims. As there are two primary
theories under which employment discrimination cases can proceed - disparate
treatment and disparate impact - this reading would have dramatic
consequences for a significant category of workplace claims.
We then explain what this new affirmative defense might look like. If it
were adopted by the courts, it would protect employers that are unaware of
their actions' unlawful disparate impact. More precisely, it would protect an
employer that, before using a workplace test, (1) reasonably examined the test
for potential disparate impact; (2) uncovered evidence that the test results
might disproportionately affect a minority protected group; and yet (3) did not
uncover evidence calling into question the test's validity. We also examine
alternative formulations of this defense that are both broader and narrower than
this one.
" See infra Part IV (setting forth the possible Ricci affirmative defense to disparate-
impact discrimination).
12 Zimmer, supra note 9, at 27-28.
13 See infra Part IV.
14 See infra Part IV.
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Part V of this Article concludes by critiquing the affirmative-defense
reading of Ricci. The defense would mark a sharp theoretical departure from
the accepted framework for disparate-impact claims. Given the time and
expense associated with the complex statistical evidence that must be
developed in most disparate-impact cases, the new defense would provide a
strong disincentive to employees considering bringing such claims. We also
compare the new defense to other non-textual affirmative defenses the
Supreme Court has read into Title VII, and situate our analysis within the other
scholarship on the Ricci decision.
I. THE ORIGINS OF DISPARATE IMPACT
For a full understanding of the Ricci decision and its significance for
disparate-impact analysis, we must initially trace the history of disparate-
impact liability under Title VII. The statute prohibits two primary forms of
employment discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate impact.'5
A. The Two Theories of Employment Discrimination
Disparate treatment - or intentional discrimination - has long been a
recognized theory of discrimination under Title VII. 16 Disparate-treatment
theory is often thought to reflect most directly the text of Title VII, which
prohibits an employer from taking an adverse action against an employee
"because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."17
" Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the
Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1368 (2009) ("Few
propositions are less controversial or more embedded in the structure of Title VII analysis
than that the statute recognizes only disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of
employment discrimination." (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Joseph A.
Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment: Adapting the Canadian
Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 95, 98-117 (2006).
16 See Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating
Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 874 (2007) ("With its focus on intent, disparate
treatment theory has long been understood to present the paradigmatic picture of
discrimination as the product of animus against or conscious reliance on irrational
stereotypes concerning members of particular groups."); Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Title VII,
Equal Employment Opportunity, and Academic Autonomy: Toward a Principled Deference,
16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1047, 1050 (1983) ("Simply, disparate treatment is intentional
discrimination.").
"7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006); see also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (noting that disparate treatment is "the most easily
understood type of discrimination" and "[u]ndoubtedly . .. the most obvious evil Congress
had in mind when it enacted Title VII"); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace
Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 91, 112 (2003) ("Traditional disparate treatment theory conceptualizes
discrimination as individual, measurable, and static, looking into the state of mind of a
particular decisionmaker at a discrete point in time.").
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The key to asserting a claim of disparate-treatment discrimination is
establishing that the employer intended to discriminate.18
Intent can be the most difficult element to satisfy when alleging a Title VII
disparate-treatment violation.19 In the seminal case of McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green,20 the Supreme Court helped plaintiffs establish this element by
setting up a burden-shifting evidentiary framework for proving intent
circumstantially. Under this framework, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie
case of discriminatory intent merely by negating some of the most obvious
alternative explanations for the employer's action - for example, that the
plaintiff was not qualified for the position or that no position was available. 21
The burden then shifts to the employer to give a nondiscriminatory explanation
for its actions. 22 Finally, a plaintiff who can show that this explanation is false
may be able to convince the fact-finder that it is a mere pretext for unlawful
discrimination. 23 While disparate-treatment cases need not proceed under the
24McDonnell Douglas framework, in practice nearly all do so, and this
framework has become the dominant mode of analysis under Title VII and
other antidiscrimination laws. 25
Disparate impact, or unintentional discrimination, addresses facially neutral
policies or practices that have an adverse impact on a group protected by Title
18 See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 ("Proof of discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment."); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161,
1168 (1995) ("Under existing law, the disparate treatment plaintiff ... must prove not only
that she was treated differently, but that such treatment was caused by purposeful or
intentional discrimination.").
'9 Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
768 (2006) ("Intentional discrimination is difficult to prove not because the evidence of
intent is lacking, but because the evidence that exists, chiefly circumstantial in nature, is
inconsistent with our societal vision of discrimination. Absent the smoking gun, racial
epithets, or other explicit exclusionary practices, it has been, and remains, hard to convince
courts that intentional discrimination exists.").
20 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
21 Id. at 802; see also Tepker, supra note 16, at 1051-52.
22 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
23 Id. at 802-04.
24 See id. at 802 n.13 ("The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the
specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.").
25 See Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 109,
114 (2007) ("[M]ost courts of law (even some that criticize it) continue to mandate [the
McDonnell Douglas test's] use - paying little heed to its detractors. Virtually all courts
continue to require unwilling plaintiffs to use McDonnell Douglas."); Stacy E.
Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good Intentions?: Stuck on State
of Mind in Antidiscrimination Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1141, 1145 (2007).
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VII. 26 The primary distinction, then, between disparate-impact and disparate-
treatment claims is that disparate impact does not require a plaintiff to establish
the employer's discriminatory intent.27
It is this lack of an intent requirement that makes disparate impact so
controversial.28 Courts and commentators have debated - and continue to
debate - whether an employer can be said to act "because of' an employee's
race or other protected trait when the employer does not subjectively rely on
that trait.29 As originally enacted, Title VII's text did not expressly state
whether it covered claims of unintentional discrimination or, if it did, what the
parameters of those claims might be.30 Unlike for disparate treatment, which is
often thought to follow straightforwardly from Title VII's "because of'
language, the question for disparate impact has been more foundational. The
question has not been how to develop an evidentiary framework to establish
theoretically uncontroversial, if practically difficult to prove, statutory
26 See Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 579, 599-600 (2001)
("The major conceptual distinction between the two theories is that disparate treatment
requires proof of discriminatory intent or motivation, while disparate impact reaches
unintentional discrimination that stems from neutral policies or practices that have a
disproportionate [effect] . . . ."); see also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335 n.15 (1977) ("[Disparate impact discrimination] involve[s] employment practices
that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.").
27 See Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims
by White Males, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1505, 1513 (2004) [hereinafter Sullivan, The World
Turned Upside Down?].
28 See Jennifer C. Braceras, Killing the Messenger: The Misuse of Disparate Impact
Theory to Challenge High-Stakes Educational Tests, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1111, 1141 (2002)
("Although there is a broad consensus favoring the use of the disparate treatment model to
eliminate purposeful discrimination in all arenas, the use of the disparate impact model to
curtail practices that are not intentionally discriminatory remains controversial and is,
therefore, limited in scope and reach." (footnotes omitted)); Selmi, supra note 19, at 702.
29 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 249 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976) ("[W]e have difficulty
understanding how a law establishing a racially neutral qualification for employment is
nevertheless racially discriminatory . . . ."); L. Camille H6bert, Redefining the Burdens of
Proof in Title VII Litigation: Will the Disparate Impact Theory Survive Wards Cove and the
Civil Rights Act of 1990?, 32 B.C. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1990); Charles Sullivan, Disparate
Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 911, 953-54
(2005) [hereinafter Sullivan, Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage] (discussing the
"enormous controversy" over the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which codified
disparate impact); infra Part I.B. (discussing the Wards Cove decision and the divisive split
on the Supreme Court over the breadth of disparate impact); infra Part II (discussing the
Ricci decision and the divisive split on the Supreme Court over the contours of disparate
impact).
30 See Seiner, supra note 15, at 101.
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elements but rather how to establish and justify those elements themselves, as
the next section addresses.
B. Acceptance of Disparate Impact
Disparate impact was initially introduced into employment-discrimination
jurisprudence in the context of seniority systems. 31 After Title VII was passed
in 1964, there was concern that minorities would still face discrimination from
the use of seniority ladders and employment tests that appeared neutral on their
face but locked in the results of past discrimination. 32 In the early cases
addressing these issues, the lower courts struggled with how to deal with the
evidence of statistical disparities that resulted from these seemingly neutral
practices. 33 The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
first proposed disparate impact as an alternative theory of discrimination that
did not require proof of intent to discriminate. 34 The lack of blame associated
with unintentional discrimination made it an attractive theory to the EEOC,
and a liability finding would still allow the agency to correct the effects of the
employer's discriminatory policies.35
A litigation strategy soon developed among disparate-impact advocates in
an attempt to convince courts to recognize this theory of discrimination. 36 The
strategy was largely patterned after the approach used in pursuing the case of
Brown v. Board of Education,37 and it consisted of filing a substantial number
of disparate-impact claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, developing a
monitoring system to identify appropriate cases, and making strategic choices
about the most promising cases to pursue.38
3 See Selmi, supra note 19, at 708-14 .
32 See id. at 710-11; see also H6bert, supra note 29, at 88 ("As long as minority group
members continue to suffer the disadvantages imposed on them by centuries of societal
discrimination, the equal treatment notion of equality underlying the disparate treatment
theory of employment discrimination will continue to fall short of the promise of true
equality for minority group members.").
33 See Selmi, supra note 19, at 708-15; Tepker, supra note 16, at 1071-72 ("In the early
years of [T]itle VII's existence, plaintiffs' attorneys were faced with an enormous challenge:
to escape the strait jacket of disparate treatment theory under which the plaintiff was
obligated to prove the employer's biased state of mind.").
3 See Selmi, supra note 19, at 715-16.
3s Id. ("[N]egotiations with employers would be smoother if they could move away from
a focus on intentional discrimination, which carried with it an implicit label of blame the
employers were expected to resist. To the EEOC, and to plaintiffs more generally, it
mattered little how a particular act was defined so long as the power to remedy the effects
were available." (citation omitted)).
36 See ROBERT BELTON ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 196 (7th ed. 2004).
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31 See BELTON ET AL., supra note 36, at 196-97.
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This strategy culminated with the Supreme Court deciding Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. 39 in 1971, just seven years after Title VII's enactment.40 Before
Title VII's enactment, the Duke Power Company had "openly discriminated"
against black workers at a particular plant in North Carolina.41 Black workers
had been permitted to work only in the plant's labor department, which paid
less than the other departments at the facility. 4 2 On July 2, 1965 - the effective
date of Title VI - the company instituted a requirement that to be placed in
any department other than labor, an employee would have to pass an aptitude
test.4 3 It also decided to start requiring a high-school diploma for transfer from
labor to another position.44 But the company exempted the existing (white)
non-labor employees from these new requirements, allowing those who lacked
high-school diplomas to remain in their positions and those who had diplomas
to transfer to the more desirable departments without taking the aptitude test.45
These facts may make it seem obvious that Duke Power's actions, although
facially neutral, were merely a pretext for continuing a policy of deliberate
discrimination against blacks.46 But the case did not proceed on this theory in
the Supreme Court - instead, it became a test of the emerging theory of
disparate impact.
Several black plaintiffs sued Duke Power, maintaining that the diploma and
standardized-test requirements were not job-related, that the new policies had
the effect of disproportionately disadvantaging black workers, and that the
company had a practice of favoring white employees. 47 The district court
acknowledged the company's prior practice of "overt racial discrimination,"
but found that this behavior had ceased following Title VII's implementation. 48
The lower court further found that "the impact of prior inequities was beyond
the reach" of the statute.49 The court of appeals agreed with the district court
and concluded that without evidence of "a racial purpose or invidious intent"
in establishing the new requirements at Duke Power, these policies were
permissible under the statute.50 The appellate court reached this conclusion
39 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
40 See ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 212 (7th
ed. 2008); BELTON ET AL., supra note 36, at 204.
41 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426-27.
42 Id. at 427.
43 Id. at 427-28.
4 Id.
45 Id. at 428.
46 See GEORGE A. RUTHERGLEN & JOHN J. DONOHUE 1II, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
LAW AND THEORY 145 (2005).
47 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425-26.
48 Id. at 428.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 429.
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while acknowledging that the requirements disproportionately affected black
workers at the plant.5'
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case to address whether
Title VII ever prohibits a facially neutral policy or practice that has an adverse
impact on a protected group.52 Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous
Supreme Court, concluded that disparate impact is a viable theory under the
statute.53 The Court thus concluded that "practices, procedures, or tests neutral
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices." 54 The Court was equally clear that Title VII was not meant to
operate as a quota system for employment:
[T]he Act does not command that any person be hired simply because he
was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of
a minority group. . . . What is required by Congress is the removal of
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classification.55
The Court further clarified that not all facially neutral policies are
prohibited, even where those practices result in an adverse impact on a
protected group. Rather, the "touchstone is business necessity," and a job-
related criterion may be used by an employer if it is facially neutral and not
used as a means of intentional discrimination. 56 Thus, the statute prohibits the
use of tests, such as the one at issue in Griggs, "unless they are demonstrably a
reasonable measure of job performance."57 According to the Court "Congress
has commanded . . . that any tests used must measure the person for the job and
not the person in the abstract."58 The Court put the burden of proof for
showing that the policy is job-related and consistent with business necessity on
the employer. 59 In thus reversing the lower courts' dismissal of the plaintiffs'
claims, the Court established the availability of disparate impact for
employment-discrimination plaintiffs. 60
51 Id. The appellate court did reverse some of the lower court opinion, "rejecting the
holding that residual discrimination arising from prior employment practices was insulated
from remedial action." Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 430.
15 Id. at 430-31.
56 Id. at 431.
5 Id. at 436.
5 Id.
59 Id. at 432.
6o Id. at 436.
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Notably absent from the Court's decision, however, was any substantive
analysis of the statutory provisions that formed the basis for the decision.61
The Court did include a footnote quoting the statute's language making it
unlawful for an employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."62 This provision of the statute may have provided the basis
for the Court's decision,63 but without a clear statutory underpinning for the
theory of disparate impact or the elements of job-relatedness and business
necessity, the contours of the theory would remain fluid." This would make it
particularly vulnerable as the makeup of the Court changed in later years.65
Although Griggs brought about a major expansion of civil rights law, the
Supreme Court restricted the breadth of the theory in its later decisions. 66
61 See BELTON ET AL., supra note 36, at 204 ("Scholars have criticized the Supreme Court
on its failure in Griggs to explain the theoretical underpinnings of the disparate impact
theory."); ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 40, at 228; Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII
Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2019-20
n.41 (1995); see generally George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An
Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REv. 1297 (1987) (discussing basis for
disparate-impact theory).
62 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426 n.] (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). See RUTHERGLEN &
DONOHUE, supra note 46, at 145 ("Griggs was decided under the original version of Title
VII, which contained no provisions specifically addressed to the theory of disparate impact.
At most, isolated clauses in the main prohibitions and defenses in the statute obliquely
address the issues . . . .").
63 See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1982); ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 40,
at 228 ("To the extent the Griggs principle can be found in the provisions of § 703, it is in
the language of paragraph (a)(2).. . .").
I See Robert Belton, The Dismantling of the Griggs Disparate Impact Theory and the
Future of Title VII: The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 223, 223
(1990) (observing that Title VII "remain[ed] silent about whether it [was] also concerned
with facially neutral employment practices, adopted without a discriminatory motive, that
adversely affect the employment opportunities of racial minorities and women"); Seiner,
supra note 15, at 97; Sullivan, Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, supra note 29, at
964.
65 See Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1479-80
(1995) ("In 1971, when Griggs was decided, the Court was in a very real sense still the
Warren Court. . . . By 1989, however, when Wards Cove was decided, Justices Black,
Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart had been replaced by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. The 1989 Court was much more conservative on racial
issues than the immediate post-Warren Court had been." (citations omitted)); Amos N.
Jones & D. Alexander Ewing, The Ghost of Wards Cove: The Supreme Court, the Bush
Administration, and the Ideology Undermining Title VII, 21 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 163,
164 (2005).
66 See Selmi, supra note 19, at 733 ("By the end of the theory's first decade, the Court
had rejected more challenges than it had accepted, and it had largely limited the [disparate
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Most notably, in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio,67 a more
conservative Supreme Court placed several stringent limitations on the scope
of disparate impact. 68 Wards Cove involved a disparate-impact claim brought
by a class of nonwhite employees at an Alaskan cannery facility. 69 The
workers alleged that their employer's hiring and promotion practices resulted
in a disproportionate number of the more skilled (and higher paying) positions
at the cannery being filled by white workers. 70 The court of appeals held that
the workers' evidence established a prima facie case of disparate impact and
that the burden then shifted to the employer to prove its business-necessity
defense.71 The Supreme Court found multiple flaws in this analysis and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 72
Among other things, the Court diluted the job-related and consistent-with-
business-necessity requirements to a standard requiring only "a reasoned
review of the employer's justification for his use of the challenged practice." 73
The employer's burden under this watered-down "reasoned review" was only
one of production; the burden of persuasion "must remain with the plaintiff'
throughout the case.74
In Wards Cove, then, the Supreme Court transformed disparate-impact
law.75 The four-Justice dissent accused the majority of engaging in "judicial
activism," arguing that it had "[t]urn[ed] a blind eye to the meaning and
purpose of Title VII" while "perfunctorily reject[ing] a longstanding rule of
law and underestimat[ing] the probative value of evidence of a racially
stratified work force." 76
The changes made by the Wards Cove majority reflected parallel
developments in disparate-treatment law. Earlier in the decade, for example,
the Court had clarified that the McDonnell Douglas framework merely shifted
- temporarily - the parties' burdens of production, but that the ultimate burden
of persuasion remained with the plaintiff.7 7 A few years later, the Court held
impact] theory to its origins - namely testing claims and perhaps some other objective
procedures capable of formal validation."); Seiner, supra note 15, at 101 ("Because
disparate impact is a creature of case law rather than statute, the Supreme Court has been
able to chip away at its protections more easily when so inclined.").
67 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
68 Id. at 657-59. See Belton, supra note 64, at 225.
6' Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 645-48.
70 Id.
7 Id. at 649.
72 Id. at 651-52.
73 Id. at 659.
74 d.
7 See id. at 657-59; Belton, supra note 64, at 240.
76 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 662-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77 Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
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that a plaintiff must prove not only that the employer's proffered explanation is
false, but also that the true reason is discriminatory. 78 In addition to making it
harder for plaintiffs to prevail in disparate-treatment cases, this development
shifted the focus from the justification for the employer's action to the question
of "discrimination vel non."79
The changes announced in Wards Cove therefore brought disparate-impact
analysis closer to disparate-treatment analysis. The parallels suggest that the
Court might have been heading in a direction that would have largely collapsed
the two theories into mere burden-of-production-shifting frameworks that
focused on the question of discrimination rather than on the justification for
the employer's actions. Had Congress not stepped in, it is conceivable that the
Court would have continued along this path. Eventually, the Court might have
made disparate impact merely an alternative evidentiary framework, not
fundamentally different from McDonnell Douglas. Disparate impact, under
this approach, would have been nothing more than a tool for smoking out
hidden intentional discrimination.80  As the facts of cases like Griggs
suggested, employers that imposed requirements that could not be justified as
job-related and that tended to screen out minorities might well be doing so as
part of a deliberate effort to keep minorities out of the workplace.8'
But even if the Court was thinking along these lines in Wards Cove, it was
not able to pursue its approach any further at that time. Congressional action
in response to Wards Cove changed the basis for, and rules governing,
disparate-impact cases. 82
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Congress responded to the Supreme Court's attempt to limit disparate-
impact theory - as well as other decisions in the employment context - through
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.83 This amendment to Title VII at least partly
overturned the Wards Cove decision, and in some measure it returned the law
78 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515-20 (1993).
* Id. at 518 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
8o See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, I15 HARV. L. REV.
642, 652 (2001) (stating that "[a] leading gloss on the conception of disparate impact
liability arising from [Griggs] is that disparate impact functions as a means of smoking out
subtle or underlying forms of intentional discrimination on the basis of group
membership"); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three,
117 HARv. L. REv. 493, 520 (2003) [hereinafter Primus, Round Three]; see also In re Emp't
Discrimination Litig. Against Ala., 198 F.3d 1305, 1321-23 (11th Cir. 1999) (discussing the
role of disparate impact in employment discrimination law); infra Part V (discussing the
view that disparate impact theory targets intentional discrimination hidden by employers).
" See Primus, Round Three, supra note 80, at 520.
82 See infra Part I.C. (addressing the impact of Civil Rights Act of 1991 on disparate-
impact claims).
83 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). See
Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?, supra note 27, at 1520.
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to how it had been interpreted before that opinion was issued.84 For the first
time, Congress also provided an unassailable textual basis for disparate-impact
claims, incorporating the theory into Title VII. 85
The statute now codifies a three-step analysis for disparate-impact cases. 86
First, the plaintiff must establish that an identified employment practice results
in a disparate impact on a protected group. 87 Second, the employer must prove
that the employment practice is "job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity."88 Finally, even if the employer satisfies its
burden on the job-relatedness question, the plaintiff can still prevail by
establishing that there is an alternative employment practice available with less
discriminatory impact that still satisfies the employer's business needs. 89
Plaintiffs pursuing disparate-impact claims, however, have limited relief
available to them. Most notably, prevailing plaintiffs in disparate-impact suits
are not entitled to compensatory or punitive damages, although a new
provision added by the 1991 law provides these damages to disparate-
treatment plaintiffs. 90
With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, then, disparate impact
finally gained the clear analytic framework it had lacked since its inception in
Griggs.9' But it remains controversial whether it is appropriate - or even
I See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 3(2), 105 Stat. at 1071 (including among the Act's
purposes "to codify the concepts of 'business necessity' and 'job related' enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior
to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio" (citations omitted)); Julia Lamber, And Promises to
Keep: The Future in Employment Discrimination, 68 IND. L.J. 857, 861 (1993). Indeed, the
fact that portions of Wards Cove are no longer good law was made explicit as to the
showing of alternative employment practices, for the statute now requires that the law
should be interpreted "as it existed on June 4, 1989 [the day before the Wards Cove
decision], with respect to [this] concept." Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105(a)(C), 105 Stat. at
1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (2006)).
85 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k); Seiner, supra note 15, at 96-97, 102-04.
86 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k); see ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 40, at 231-75; Peter Mahoney,
The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair Housing and Lending Law,
and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 422-24 (1998).
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A). A plaintiff must show that "each particular challenged
employment practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party can
demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process are not
capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one
employment practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B).
88 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); see RUTHERGLEN &
DONOHUE, supra note 46, at 148.
89 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(ii); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(C); see Michelle A.
Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination Law, 62
WASH & LEE L. REv. 3, 38 (2005).
9 42 U.S.C. § 1981 a; see Primus, Round Three, supra note 80, at 521 n. 118.
91 See RUTHERGLEN & DONOHUE, supra note 46, at 145; Seiner, supra note 15, at 103
(recognizing that with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 "disparate impact had
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constitutional - to hold employers liable when they have not engaged in
intentional discrimination. 92
II. RiccI V. DESTEFANO
In 2003, the City of New Haven, Connecticut administered a test to 118 of
its firefighters for possible promotions to lieutenant and captain positions
within the department. 93 The City planned to use the test to determine who
would be eligible for these upcoming promotions for the next two years, and
many candidates studied extensively for the exam "at considerable personal
and financial cost." 94
The City hired a consulting group, at a cost of one hundred thousand dollars,
to help prepare and administer the tests. 95 The consultants selected by the City
specialized in promotional tests administered to public-safety officials, and the
group performed an extensive analysis to make certain that the exam would
measure the knowledge and skills necessary for the vacant positions.96 As part
of this process, the group observed the officers' daily tasks and conducted
interviews with people in the department.97  Minority firefighters were
"oversampled" as part of this analytical process to make certain that the test
ultimately developed would not be biased against minority candidates.98 Based
on this information and other departmental sources such as training manuals
and departmental procedures, the consulting group developed a multiple-
choice exam and a separate oral test.99
To grade the oral examinations, the group selected thirty assessors, all of
whom held a higher rank than the positions that were being filled. 00 Two-
thirds of these assessors were minorities, and all of these individuals received
several hours of training on how to evaluate candidate responses.101 The
candidates sat for the test at the end of 2003, and the results revealed that a
disproportionate number of white exam-takers had passed the exam:
Seventy-seven candidates completed the lieutenant examination - 43
whites, 19 blacks, and 15 Hispanics. Of those, 34 candidates passed - 25
clear statutory backing"); Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?, supra note 27, at
1534.
92 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682-83 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(questioning the constitutional validity of the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII).
" Id. at 2664-65 (2009) (majority opinion).
94 Id. at 2664.




99 Id. at 2665-66.
'0 Id. at 2666.
1o1 Id.
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whites, 6 blacks, and 3 Hispanics. . . . [T]he top 10 candidates were
eligible for an immediate promotion to lieutenant. All 10 were white....
Forty-one candidates completed the captain examination - 25 whites, 8
blacks, and 8 Hispanics. Of those, 22 candidates passed - 16 whites, 3
blacks, and 3 Hispanics. . . . [Nine] candidates were eligible for an
immediate promotion to captain - 7 whites and 2 Hispanics. 10 2
Though City officials questioned whether these results suggested that the
examination was discriminatory, the consulting group maintained that the test
was valid and that the poor performance of minority candidates "was likely
due to various external factors."1 03 The consulting group also indicated that
these results were consistent with other departmental tests. 10 At hearings on
whether to certify the examination results, the New Haven Civil Service Board
heard from firefighters who argued strenuously on both sides of the issue.105
The validity of the test was vigorously debated, and the leader of the
consulting-group team that had prepared the examination explained how the
test was job-related and "facially neutral." 106 The Board also heard from an
industrial psychologist who expressed concerns about the methodology of the
examination but concluded that the test was "reasonably good." 107 A retired
minority fire captain from another state further indicated that the test questions
were job-related.108 And a university professor told the Board that the results
were consistent with testing in other areas. 109
At the final Board meeting on the issue, New Haven's city counsel
nonetheless argued that the results should not be certified because of the City's
potential liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.110 Some
described the written test as having had "severe adverse impacts.""' The chief
administrative officer, who appeared on behalf of New Haven's mayor, also
argued that the test should be discarded because the results "created a situation
in which black and Hispanic candidates were disproportionately excluded from
opportunity." 1l2 At the end of the meeting, the Board was deadlocked in a vote





105 Id. at 2667.
106 Id. at 2667-68 (citation omitted).
107 Id. at 2669 (citation omitted).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 2669-70.
... Id. at 2670.
112 Id
" Id. at 2671.
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A group of white firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter who passed the
test sued the City, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII, and other statutory provisions.114 The
district court entered summary judgment for the City, concluding that the
City's "'motivation to avoid making promotions based on a test with a racially
disparate impact . . . does not, as a matter of law, constitute discriminatory
intent' under Title VII.""5 The Second Circuit affirmed in a short per curiam
opinion, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari."16
In a 5-4 vote the Supreme Court reversed and entered judgment for the
plaintiff firefighters." 7 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy recounted the
plaintiffs' argument that by failing to certify the test results, the City
"discriminated against them in violation of Title VII's disparate-treatment
provision."" 8 In contrast, the City maintained that its refusal to certify the
examination results did not violate the statute because "the tests appear[ed] to
violate Title VII's disparate impact provisions."ll 9 The Supreme Court
therefore saw its task as resolving this apparent conflict between the disparate-
treatment and disparate-impact provisions of the statute.120
The Court began its analysis by making it clear that the City's decision to
discard the test "would violate the disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII
absent some valid defense."'21 Even though the City's actions may have been
"well intentioned" and "benevolent," the decision was still made on the basis
of race in violation of Title VII, as the examination was discarded "because the
higher scoring candidates were white." 22 The City's "express, race-based
decisionmaking violates Title VII's command that employers cannot take
adverse employment actions because of an individual's race." 23 Thus, the
Court determined that the City would be liable under Title VII unless an
employer's attempt to avoid a disparate-impact suit creates a defense that
would "excuse[] what otherwise would be prohibited" conduct.124
In considering the contours of such a defense, the Court adopted a "strong-
basis-in-evidence standard" for Title VH claims "to resolve any conflict
between the disparate-treatment and disparate impact provisions."125 Thus, an
employer may "engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of
114 Id.
115 Id. (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 160 (D. Conn. 2006)).
116 Id. at 2672.
117 Id. at 2663-64.
"1 Id. at 2673 (emphasis added).
"9 Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 2673.
122 Id. at 2674.
123 Id. at 2673.
124 Id. at 2674.
125 Id. at 2676.
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avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact" only if the employer
has "a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact
liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action."l 26
Applying this standard, the Court concluded that the statistical disparity
reflected in the test results failed to create a strong basis in evidence justifying
the City's belief that it would have been liable for disparate impact if it had
certified these results.127 Even with this statistical disparity, the City would
still have been able to avoid liability if it could have demonstrated that the tests
were job-related and consistent with business necessity. 28 If the City had
satisfied this job-related standard, minority firefighters challenging the test
would not have been able to prevail unless they established that "there existed
an equally valid, less-discriminatory alternative that served the City's needs
but that the City refused to adopt." 29
Given the extensive measures taken by the consulting group in creating and
administering the tests - and taking into account the statements of the
witnesses who appeared before the Civil Service Board - the Court found no
factual dispute as to whether the tests were job-related and consistent with
business necessity.13 0 Indeed, the majority concluded that the City had "turned
a blind eye to evidence that supported the exams' validity."'31 Thus, the City
had not shown a strong basis in evidence for its belief that the tests were not
job-related and consistent with business necessity.132 Similarly, the Court
failed to find a strong basis in evidence for a less discriminatory alternative to
the testing procedures used by the City.13 3 In this regard, the City's failure to
implement another selection procedure immediately may have proven fatal to
this part of its case, because its inaction suggested that an equally effective
alternative was not readily at hand.134 Taking all of these facts into account,
the Court held that the City's attempt to "create a genuine issue of fact based
on a few stray (and contradictory) statements in the record" failed to rise to the
strong-basis-in-evidence standard.135
In sum, the Court found "no evidence - let alone the required strong basis in
evidence - that the tests were flawed because they were not job-related or
because other, equally valid and less discriminatory tests were available to the
City." 36 The Court emphasized that "[flear of litigation alone cannot justify
126 Id. at 2677.
127 Id. at 2678.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 2678-79.
131 Id. at 2679.
132 Id. at 2678-79.
'1 Id. at 2679.
134 See id. at 2679-8 1.
"I Id. at 2680.
136 Id. at 2681.
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an employer's reliance on race to the detriment of individuals who passed the
examinations and qualified for promotions." 37 The process used by the City
in developing and administering the tests was "open and fair," the City had
been careful to craft a neutral exam, and it had encouraged "broad racial
participation." 3 8 The Court thus concluded that the City's refusal to certify
the examination results violated Title VII's disparate-treatment provisions and
ruled that summary judgment should have been entered for the firefighters.139
More importantly for purposes of this Article, in concluding the opinion the
Court also addressed the possibility that the City might face a disparate-impact
claim brought by minority firefighters once the test results were certified.140
Though no such suit had been filed, and the issue was not presently before the
Court, the majority opined that the minority firefighters could not prevail:
If, after it certifies the test results, the City faces a disparate-impact suit,
then in light of our holding today it should be clear that the City would
avoid disparate-impact liability based on the strong basis in evidence that,
had it not certified the results, it would have been subject to disparate-
treatment liability.141
Because the Court concluded that the white and Hispanic plaintiffs succeeded
on their Title VII claim, it also determined that it was unnecessary to address
the potential Equal Protection Clause issue.142
Justice Scalia, concurring in full in the Court's opinion, addressed the equal
protection issue that the majority avoided.143 Justice Scalia questioned the
constitutional validity of the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII, noting
that if the government cannot discriminate against an individual because of
race, "then surely [the government] is also prohibited from enacting laws
mandating that third parties - e.g., employers, whether private, State, or
municipal - discriminate on the basis of race." 144 In Justice Scalia's view,
disparate impact puts "a racial thumb on the scales," frequently forcing
companies "to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies." 45 Though
acknowledging that the issue need not be resolved in this case, he opined that
"it behooves us to begin thinking about how - and on what terms - to make







143 Id. at 2681-83 (Scalia, J, concurring).
144 Id. at 2682.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 2683. Justice Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, wrote a separate
concurrence as well, addressing the dissent's concerns that "the Court's recitation of the
facts leaves out important parts of the story." Id. at 2683-90 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Writing for the dissent, Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Breyer) argued that the majority's holding "ignores substantial evidence of
multiple flaws in the tests New Haven used," and noted that other cities have
utilized better examinations that resulted in smaller racial disparities. 14 7 The
dissent also noted that the majority had failed to paint a complete picture of the
situation in New Haven, highlighting the racial disparity in the composition of
the City's firefighters that had persisted for years (and that the majority's
opinion had omitted).148 The dissent accused the majority of breaking a
longstanding promise of civil rights law "that groups long denied equal
opportunity would not be held back by tests 'fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation.' "149
As the dissent's vehemence reflects, Ricci represents a significant
development in disparate-treatment doctrine that may profoundly influence
that area of the law, especially so-called reverse-discrimination lawsuits
alleging a bias in favor of minorities.150 Other scholarship is focusing on this
aspect of the decision, including potential limitations on the Court's analysis
and its implications for traditional Title VII (as opposed to reverse-
discrimination) cases. 151
Ricci will also have a strong influence on the future of disparate-impact law.
The Court's extended analysis of the evidence on job-relatedness and
alternatives is likely to affect how lower courts approach those issues in other
cases.152  Justice Scalia's concurrence also raises questions about the
constitutionality of Title VII's prohibition on disparate impact.153  Other
scholarship is examining these constitutional questions, and what they may
signal about the future of the whole disparate-impact framework. 154
All of these issues merit further exploration. Here, however, we will focus
on a separate issue: What does the cryptic passage at the end of the majority
opinion about a hypothetical disparate-impact case against the City mean for
147 Id. at 2690-91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 2691.
149 Id. at 2710 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
150 See id. at 2689-2710.
151 See, e.g., Zimmer, supra note 9, at 4.
152 Scholars have already questioned the validity of the statistical approach taken by the
lower courts, however. See Joseph L. Gastwirth & Weiwen Miao, Formal Statistical
Analysis of the Data in Disparate Impact Cases Provides Sounder Inferences than the U.S.
Government's 'Four-Fifths' Rule: An Examination of the Statistical Evidence in Ricci v.
DeStefano, 8 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 171, 173 (2009) (arguing that, under the
framework used by the lower court, there is a 60% chance that even a perfectly fair test will
be found to have a disparate impact).
15 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring).
154 See, e.g., Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, supra note 9, at 1342-45 (arguing
that there are three ways to read Ricci, only one of which is fatal to disparate-impact
doctrine).
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disparate-impact's doctrinal framework? We discuss possible interpretations
of this passage below.
III. POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF RIcci
Broadly speaking, there are three kinds of interpretations one could give to
Ricci's coda, which states that the City - should it face a disparate-impact suit
by minority firefighters who failed the exam - "would avoid disparate-impact
liability based on the strong basis in evidence that, had it not certified the
results, it would have been subject to disparate-treatment liability."155 First,
one could look at this as the Court's commentary on the particular facts of the
case before it rather than an articulation of a general principle of law. Second,
one could try to understand it as a general doctrinal principle for disparate-
impact cases rather than a mere commentary on the particular facts presented.
And third, one could treat it as confused and ultimately meaningless dicta that
has no forward-looking significance whatsoever. We examine the first and
third possibilities in this part of the Article; after explaining their
shortcomings, we examine the second possibility in Part IV.
A. The Case-Specific Reading
The case-specific reading understands the cryptic passage as merely
observing that no disparate-impact claim could be successfully brought against
New Haven, because the evidence before the Court had shown conclusively
that the test was job-related and that there was no available alternative with
less discriminatory impact that would equally suit the City's needs. On this
reading, the Court was stating that as a matter of fact, no suit against New
Haven could possibly succeed even if plaintiffs were to adduce more evidence.
Perhaps the Court was signaling to plaintiffs that it would not be plausible even
to allege that the test has a disparate impact, thereby inviting the lower courts
to dismiss such a claim at the threshold stage.156
This reading is attractive to those who find the affirmative defense described
below problematic, because it offers an alternative interpretation that does not
treat the passage as completely meaningless. But the fact-specific reading is
hard to square with the precise language the Court used in Ricci. The Court
phrased its observation in probabilistic terms: New Haven "would avoid
disparate-impact liability based on the strong basis in evidence that, had it not
certified the results, it would have been subject to disparate-treatment
liability."157 The term "strong basis in evidence" implies a prediction about the
likely outcome of a suit that has not happened. But here New Haven did refuse
to certify the results and was held liable, which makes the "strong basis in
'5 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681.
156 See Howard Wasserman, When Ricci Met Iqbal, PRAWFSBLAWG (Oct. 16, 2009,
12:17 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/10/when-ricci-met-iqbal.html.
'5 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681 (emphasis added).
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evidence" language puzzling if it were meant just as an observation about the
particular facts of this case. If the Court had intended to limit its statement to
the facts of this specific case, it likely would have said that New Haven "would
avoid disparate-impact liability because, when it refused to certify the results,
it was subject to disparate-treatment liability." The Court's use of predictive
language makes sense only if it were intending to say something that could
apply beyond the facts of this case.
The case-specific reading also poses doctrinal difficulties. Ordinarily,
nonparties are not bound by the outcome of lawsuits in which they did not
participate and over which they had no control.158 That generally applies even
when the nonparty's interests are aligned with those of a party to the case, so
long as the two do not have a special legal relationship, as when the party is the
nonparty's fiduciary or a class representative. 159 For the Court to suggest
otherwise here would be a remarkable departure.
As some scholars have noted in trying to understand this part of Ricci, there
is a controversial provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that purports to
abrogate the general principle of non-preclusion in some Title VII cases. 160
Under that provision, an employment practice that implements a court order in
an employment-discrimination suit may not be challenged by a person whose
interests were adequately represented in the prior lawsuit, except in limited
circumstances such as collusion. 161 But the Supreme Court has never addressed
this provision, and it raises constitutional questions about the due process
rights of nonparties to the first lawsuit.162 If the Court in Ricci meant to say
that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 would bar future disparate-impact claims
against New Haven brought by nonparties to the Ricci litigation, and that it
would do so constitutionally, it picked a rather obscure way to announce this
conclusion. At the very least, the case-specific reading is not preferable to the
.ss See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-95 (2008) (explaining the general rule and
the limited exceptions).
159 See id. (reviewing six categories of recognized exceptions to the rule against nonparty
preclusion).
"s See Charles A. Sullivan, Ricci v. DeStefano: End of the Line or Just Another Turn on
the Disparate Impact Road?, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 201, 214 (2009),
http://www.law.northwestem.edullawreview/colloquy/2009/40/LRColl2009n4OSullivan.pdf
[hereinafter Sullivan, End of the Line] ("Congress provided that a prior decree in a civil
rights suit can bind nonparties if they either (1) had notice and the opportunity to intervene
or (2) were adequately represented in the earlier suit. Assuming that this statute comports
with due process, it seems likely that at least one prong will be met, which would allow the
white fire-fighters to retain the gains they made in Ricci." (footnotes omitted)); Zimmer,
supra note 9, at 28 & n.73 ("Generally, only parties to an action are bound by a judgment in
that action but, nevertheless, there is an argument that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides
for preclusion.").
... See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (2006).
162 See Sullivan, End of the Line, supra note 160, at 214.
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alternatives on the ground that it easily fits into existing doctrinal
frameworks.16 3
The clearest test of this case-specific reading is already in court. A
disparate-impact suit has already been filed against the City by a minority
firefighter who did poorly on the test.'1 The district court dismissed the
complaint, citing Ricci's language, and that decision has been appealed.165
B. The Confused-Dicta Reading
Because of the shortcomings of the case-specific readings, some scholars
have dismissed the Court's language as meaningless dicta.166 Perhaps, for
example, the Court merely intended to convey again that the evidence of
disparate impact presented to it was insufficient. Thus, if a future disparate-
impact lawsuit by minority firefighters presented exactly the same evidence,
the City would prevail. Or maybe the Court meant only to predict that the City
likely would win any disparate-impact suit it might face, not to lay down a
holding that the City absolutely would win.
The language the Court actually used does not reflect any such
interpretation, and for that reason alone one might reject it. Of course, it
remains possible that the Court's language was merely sloppy. But because
the lower courts take seriously even dicta from the Supreme Court, 167 we set
aside this possibility for the moment and try to accept the Court's language at
face value. And as we explain below, one can construct a plausible
interpretation of Ricci as establishing an affirmative defense similar to other
policy-driven defenses that the Court has created under Title VII.168
In doing so, we do not mean to imply that the affirmative-defense
interpretation is the best reading of Ricci. It may be, as others have suggested,
that the passage is merely ill-considered dictum that suggests nothing
163 See id. ("[F]rom a civil procedure perspective, the normal rule is that the black
firefighters may not be bound by a judgment in a case in which they are not parties.").
164 See Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief at 2, Briscoe v. New Haven, No.
3:09-cv-01642 (CSH) (D. Conn. Oct. 15, 2009) (alleging that the written examination used
by the New Haven Fire Department had a "disparate impact on African-American
candidates").
165 Briscoe v. New Haven, No. 3:09-cv-01642 (CSH), 2010 WL 2794231, at *2 (D.
Conn. July 12, 2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-1975 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 2010).
166 See, e.g., Zimmer, supra note 9, at 28, 30 (calling this passage "obscure" and
"inscrutable").
167 See, e.g., United States v. Oakar, 111 F.3d 146, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("'[C]arefully
considered language of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, generally must be
treated as authoritative."' (quoting Doughty v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 6 F.3d 856,
861 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993))). See generally Lisa M. Durham Taylor, Parsing Supreme Court
Dicta to Adjudicate Non-Workplace Harms, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 75 (2008) (discussing the
use of Supreme Court dicta by the lower courts).
168 See infra Part V (discussing the analogy between the Ricci affirmative defense and
affirmative defensives in other areas of employment-discrimination law).
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significant about the future of disparate-impact law. But we focus on the
possibility of a new affirmative defense because, as explained below, it is both
the most interesting reading of Ricci and facially no less plausible than the
alternatives, each of which suffers from linguistic or doctrinal shortcomings. If
the Court is heading down the path we identify here, it is important to
understand the profound changes that may be coming. And if, on the other
hand, the consequences of the affirmative-defense reading that we identify are
unacceptable, it is important to clarify that now in order to steer the courts in
another direction. Ultimately, we do not aim to answer the normative question
of whether the courts should adopt the affirmative-defense reading; we merely
try to describe what such a defense would look like and what it would mean for
the future of disparate-impact law.
IV. THE AFFIRMATIVE-DEFENSE READING
We explain here how the Court's language could be understood to create a
new affirmative defense for employers in disparate-impact cases. Under this
reading, an employer would be able to defend against a claim of disparate
impact by showing that at the time it took the challenged employment action, it
was not aware that the test had an unlawful disparate impact. In other words, if
after investigating the matter the employer found evidence that its test had a
disproportionate effect on a protected group but concluded that the test was
job-related and consistent with business necessity, and that there were no
alternative tests available with less discriminatory impact that would similarly
serve its business needs, it would be irrelevant whether the employer's
conclusions were correct. Even if a court ultimately concluded that the test
was not job-related, or that there was an equally effective alternative that had
less disparity, the employer would be insulated from liability because it did not
know this at the time the employment decision was made.
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we show how Ricci can be read to
suggest a new affirmative defense for employers that took reasonable steps to
investigate and mitigate the adverse impacts of a challenged employment
practice before implementing it.169 Second, we offer a possible structure for
this affirmative defense, including a limited safe harbor for employers that
conduct validation studies.170
Some final preliminary notes: throughout our analysis, we will assume that
the employment practice at issue is a workplace examination. Doing so makes
our discussion less abstract, and it makes the comparison to Ricci itself -
which involved an employment examination - clearer. To the extent that
Ricci's holding may apply to other employment practices, such as the diploma
requirement in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,171 much of what we say would
apply equally to those practices.
69 See infra Part IV.A.
"70 See infra Part IV.B.
'71 401 U.S. 424, 429-36 (1971).
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Similarly, we examine the Court's language from the perspective of a
lawsuit filed after the policy or test was actually implemented by the employer.
As another scholar has noted, lawsuits brought before implementation (during
the design-phase of the test) may involve additional considerations that Ricci
(and therefore our analysis here) does not contemplate. 172
A. The New Affirmative Defense to Disparate Impact
In describing how New Haven would defend against a hypothetical
disparate-impact lawsuit, the Court stated that "the City would avoid disparate-
impact liability based on the strong basis in evidence that, had it not certified
the results, it would have been subject to disparate-treatment liability." 73 This
corollary to Ricci's primary holding may indicate that Title VII is symmetric.
The Court's principal holding is that potential disparate-impact liability does
not automatically trump disparate-treatment liability; it does so only if the
employer shows a strong basis in evidence to fear disparate-impact liability.174
Conversely, the statement at the end of the majority opinion suggests that
potential disparate-treatment liability does not automatically trump disparate-
impact liability; it does so only if the employer shows a strong basis in
evidence for the fear.175 To generalize, an employer's fear of one form of
liability under Title VII is a defense to another form of liability if and only if
the employer has a strong basis in evidence for the fear.
If this approach is correct, in addition to the express defense announced by
the Court for intentional discrimination claims, an employer that bases an
employment decision on workplace test results would have a defense to a
claim of disparate impact if it can show:
(1) a strong basis in evidence that
(2) it would have been liable for disparate treatment if it had discarded
the test results.176
Together with Ricci's primary holding on disparate-treatment liability, these
two elements would establish an affirmative defense to disparate-impact
liability for an employer that thought its actions were lawful at the time it took
them.
Element (1) of the defense requires the employer to make an evidentiary
showing.177 This signals that the legal principle at issue is an affirmative
defense - a matter as to which the defendant, rather than the plaintiff, bears the
172 See Zimmer, supra note 9, at 24-28.
173 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009).
174 See id. at 2664-65.
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burden of proof - and thus suggests that the employer may not rely on the mere
absence of evidence. 78
Element (2) of the defense - that the employer would have been liable for
disparate treatment had it discarded the test results - is the heart of the
affirmative defense. Ricci's primary holding explains what this element
requires. An employer is subject to disparate-treatment liability if it discarded
a test based on concerns about its disparate impact without having a strong
basis in evidence to believe that the test had an unlawful disparate impact.179
By unlawful disparate impact, we mean not only that the test
disproportionately disadvantages minorities, but also that either it is not job-
related or there is a less discriminatory alternative. Thus, element (2) requires
that the employer show that it was aware of the statistical disparity but lacked a
strong basis in evidence to believe that the test had an unlawful disparate
impact. 180
Although at first blush this formulation may appear circular - that the
employer must disprove disparate impact to defend against a disparate-impact
claim - the requirements are compatible if the two showings refer to different
times. Disparate treatment is a doctrine about intent, and to determine whether
an employer's intent in taking an action was proper, one must examine what
the employer knew at that time. In the context of element (2), therefore, the
employer would be showing that at the time it took the challenged action, it
knew about the statistical disparity but lacked a strong basis in evidence to
believe that the test had an unlawful disparate impact.
Under this approach, for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim of disparate impact
it would not be enough that a test in fact had an unlawful disparate impact. It
also would have to be that the employer knew about the unlawful disparate
impact when it accepted the test's results. If the employer did not know about
the test's unlawful impact, then it would not have had a strong basis in
evidence to think that the test had an unlawful impact.' 8'
One more element must be considered to round out the affirmative defense.
It would not be enough for an employer to rely on ignorance as the basis for
the defense; rather an employer should have to have undertaken some sort of
inquiry as to the test's validity before it used it. First, as the formulations
above suggest, the employer had to know about the statistical disparity that
affects a minority group before using the test. If the employer did not know
"8 See Ronald J. Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified
Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARv. L. REv. 321, 327 (1980) ("An
affirmative defense is defined as an issue upon which the defendant bears the burden of
persuasion, usually by the standard of a preponderance of the evidence." (footnote
omitted)); Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward
a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REv 1205, 1214-15 (1981).
"9 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677.
Iso See id.
"' See id. at 2681.
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about the disparity, its decision to discard the test could not be disparate
treatment because it could not have had a racial (or other group-based)
motivation for acting. Second, having uncovered evidence of the disparity, the
employer had to make a reasonable effort to determine if the test was
nonetheless valid. If mere good-faith ignorance were enough, Ricci would be
discarding some of the most important language in Griggs, which emphasized
that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent" is not enough to defend
against a claim of disparate impact, 182 and it would essentially be jettisoning
the entire concept of disparate impact, which addresses unintentional
discrimination.183 But the Ricci majority reaffirmed the basic approach of
Griggs,184 and Justice Scalia's concurrence noted the lack of a general good-
faith defense to claims of disparate impact.185 Requiring that the employer
affirmatively establish the sound basis of its workplace decision would
preserve the possibility of liability for unintentional discrimination while still
giving content to the defense.
Putting all of this together, the affirmative-defense reading of Ricci would
allow an employer to defend against a claim of disparate impact by showing
that at the time it took the challenged employment action, it did not believe that
the test had an unlawful disparate impact. To avail itself of the defense, an
employer would have to have undertaken some sort of fact-finding to establish
evidence of a statistical disparity and to justify its belief in the test's validity
before using the test.
If this formulation is correct, an employer might be able to establish the
affirmative defense for past actions but - because of new information it has
become aware of - not be able to invoke it prospectively. For example, if in
the course of a disparate-impact suit the plaintiff were to submit a new
validation study calling an employment test into question, the protection
conferred by the Ricci affirmative defense would be only retrospective. The
employer might avoid any liability for the actions challenged in that lawsuit,
but it also would have received evidence calling the test's validity into
question during the course of the litigation. That evidence - the plaintiff s new
study - would give the employer a factual basis to discard the test
prospectively based on its disparate impact. If the employer refused to do so
and was sued again for workplace decisions taken after the first lawsuit, the
affirmative defense would no longer protect its use of the employment test.
In this respect, a Ricci affirmative defense would resemble the doctrine of
qualified immunity, which protects government officials sued under 42 U.S.C.
182 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
18 See supra Part I (discussing the background and theoretical basis for disparate-impact
claims).
'" Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2672-73.
'" Id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he disparate-impact provisions ... fail to
provide an affirmative defense for good-faith (i.e., nonracially motivated) conduct, or
perhaps even for good faith plus hiring standards that are entirely reasonable.").
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§ 1983 for violating a defendant's federal rights.186 Qualified immunity
shields these officials from personal liability for damages unless their conduct
violates the defendant's "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known." 87 As the Supreme Court has
explained "[t]he protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether
the government official's error is a mistake of law, 'a mistake of fact, or a
mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.'" 188 But even if the
officials are ultimately immune from damages, the court adjudicating the
dispute can clarify the law, thereby ensuring that in future cases officials will
not be able to continue to rely on qualified immunity. 189 And qualified
immunity does not bar claims for prospective injunctive relief, which again
allows the court to prevent further violations without imposing retrospective
liability for past conduct. 190
A Ricci affirmative defense likewise might prevent a court from awarding
retrospective relief, but it should not prevent the court from determining
prospectively that a test has an unlawful disparate impact. While
compensatory or punitive damages are not available in disparate-impact
cases,191 plaintiffs typically can obtain instatement to the jobs they should have
received and back pay to cover the period during which they were denied their
rightful positions. 19 2 When plaintiffs show that a test has an unlawful disparate
impact, the analogy to qualified immunity suggests that even if these
traditional remedies were unavailable to plaintiffs because of the Ricci
affirmative defense, the court could still enjoin the employer from continuing
to use the test as a basis for future employment decisions.
186 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
117 Id. at 818; see John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE
L.J. 259, 264 (2000) ("Doctrinally, therefore, qualified immunity applies comprehensively
to all damages actions brought against state and local officers under § 1983, as well as to
analogous actions against federal officers under Bivens.. .. In all such cases, the defendant
is immune from award of money damages 'if a reasonable officer could have believed' in
the legality of the act that caused the plaintiffs injury." (citation omitted)).
1" Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S.
551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
1" See id. at 818 (affirming that this procedure "promotes the development of
constitutional precedent and is especially valuable with respect to questions that do not
frequently arise in cases in which a qualified immunity defense is unavailable").
190 See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (noting that "in a suit
to enjoin further conduct," qualified immunity would not be "available to block a
determination of law").
191 See 42 U.S.C. § 198la(a)(1) (2006); supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing
damages in disparate-impact cases).
192 See § 2000e-5(g)(1); Cheryl L. Anderson, Damages for Intentional Discrimination by
Public Entities Under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Rose by Any Other
Name, But Are the Remedies the Same?, 9 BYU J. PuB. L. 235, 240 n.19 (1995); Primus,
Round Three, supra note 80, at 521 n. 118.
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The analogy between the Ricci affirmative defense - assuming it exists -
and qualified immunity is far from perfect. Qualified immunity is an objective
standard - the question is what an official reasonably should have known, not
what he or she in fact knew - whereas the affirmative defense as we have
described it is subjective, turning on what the employer in fact knew rather
than what it should have known. And although neither doctrine has a clear
textual basis in the statute, qualified immunity is driven by policy concerns
about preventing "unwarranted timidity" by government officials who are
supposed to be protecting the public interest.193 As the Supreme Court has
recognized, this concern - and therefore the protection of qualified immunity -
generally does not carry over to the realm of private, profit-making
activities.194 Most employers, of course, operate within that realm. And
qualified immunity generally protects only individuals; their employers - such
as municipalities like New Haven - are not themselves entitled to qualified
immunity.195 Whatever the shortcomings of the analogy, however, qualified
immunity offers a way to understand the temporal character of a Ricci defense
that required courts to look at the facts as they were understood at the time of
the relevant decision rather than during the course of the litigation.
B. Validation Studies as a Limited Safe Harbor
The Ricci affirmative defense described above would allow an employer to
defend against a claim of disparate impact by showing that at the time it took
the challenged employment action, it did not believe that the test had an
unlawful disparate impact despite having investigated the matter.196 There
might be several ways to satisfy such an affirmative defense at this high level
of abstraction. One would be a formal validation study. As we explain below,
under the affirmative defense as we have described it, an employer that relied
on a properly conducted formal validation study would probably not be liable
for disparate impact. Although employers might sometimes be able to satisfy
the affirmative defense even without formal validation studies, those studies
might offer employers a safe harbor from disparate-impact liability. But this
safe harbor would apply only when the employer did not also have
independent evidence calling the test's validity into question. Once the
employer had reason to doubt the test's validity - for example, because a
plaintiff in a suit proffered evidence that the test was in fact invalid - the
employer could not continue to rely on a validation study to avoid disparate-
impact liability. For this reason, we refer to validation studies as a limited safe
harbor.
193 Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 408 (1997).
19 Id.; Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168 (1992) ("In short, the nexus between private
parties and the historic purposes of qualified immunity is simply too attenuated to justify
such an extension of our doctrine of immunity.").
1 See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 841 n.5.
196 See supra Part IV.A.
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Validation studies are a familiar concept under Title VII and in the field of
test development more generally. Griggs itself criticized an employer for
adopting a test "without meaningful study" of its job-relatedness. 197 While an
employer may not always need to conduct a formal validation study to win a
disparate-impact suit, 198 the federal government encourages employers to do so
whenever it is technically feasible. 199 Federal enforcement agencies, including
the Department of Justice and the EEOC, have adopted the Uniform Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures200 to explain in detail how to validate tests
and other selection procedures. These guidelines walk employers through the
steps they need to take to conduct proper validation studies, including
gathering information about job requirements, investigating potential
unfairness for minority groups, and examining less-discriminatory
alternatives.201 Above all, the guidelines emphasize that the methods should be
consistent with "generally accepted professional standards for evaluating
standardized tests and other selection procedures." 20 2
Under Ricci's affirmative defense as we have explained it, an employer that
examined a test's impact in advance of its employment decision and found no
reason to conclude that the test had an unlawful disparate impact would not be
liable even if plaintiffs were later to prove that the test did in fact have an
unlawful disparate impact.203 If a validation study showed that the test was
job-related, consistent with business necessity, and had no more disparate
impact than any equally effective alternatives, then - without more - the
employer would not have had a strong basis in evidence to conclude that the
test has an unlawful disparate impact. Ricci suggests that such an employer
could not discard the test results based on the disparate impact without opening
itself to liability for disparate treatment. 204 Under the affirmative-defense
197 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
198 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988) (plurality opinion)
("Our cases make it clear that employers are not required, even when defending
standardized or objective tests, to introduce formal 'validation studies' showing that
particular criteria predict actual on-the-job performance."); Sullivan, Looking Past the
Desert Palace Mirage, supra note 29, at 994 ("[F]ormal validation, as it is employed in
disparate impact cases challenging testing regimes, will not be required across the spectrum
of disparate impact cases. . . . [M]any cases have always approached business necessity
from a more qualitative, less empirical, perspective." (footnotes omitted)).
199 See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1(B),
1607.5-1607.6 (2009).
200 Id. pt. 1607.
201 Id. §§ 1607.1-1607.16.
202 Id. § 1607.5(C).
203 See supra Part IV.A (identifying the affirmative defense to disparate-impact claims
potentially created by the Supreme Court in the Ricci decision and explaining the contours
of that defense).
204 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009).
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reading, therefore, an employer that relied on a formal validation study
ordinarily would not be liable for disparate impact.
In this respect, the defense would go beyond what pre-Ricci law provided.
Before Ricci, a validation study presumably would satisfy the employer's
burden of producing evidence of job-relatedness, and often that would be
enough to prevail on a motion for summary judgment. 205 But the plaintiffs
could have produced competing studies of their own demonstrating that the test
was not job related or that there were alternatives that would have had less of a
disparate impact.206 That would have created a question of fact for the court to
resolve at trial.207 In this situation, a Ricci affirmative defense would insulate
an employer from the risk of an adverse factual finding. Even if the plaintiffs
produced a conflicting validation study during the litigation, the court could
grant summary judgment to the employer - at least as to damages - on the
ground that there is no dispute that at the time of the employment action the
employer did not have a basis to question the validity of the test.2 0 8
This alone would be a significant development in disparate-impact law, but
the affirmative-defense reading of Ricci may suggest an even broader rule.
While formal validation studies would provide a safe harbor with relatively
clear contours, the Ricci affirmative defense might not invariably require a
formal validation study of the sort prescribed by the Uniform Guidelines.209
Any serious effort to gauge the fairness and job-relatedness of a test, including
examining its alternatives, could give an employer a basis to believe that the
test did not have an unlawful disparate impact. In Ricci itself, for example, the
Supreme Court did not characterize New Haven's test-validation efforts as
amounting to a formal validation study, and it is not clear that such a study had
205 See Belton, supra note 64, at 232; David Yellen, The Bottom Line Defense in Title VII
Actions: Supreme Court Rejection in Connecticut v. Teal and a Modified Approach, 68
CORNELL L. REv. 735, 749 (1983).
206 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988); Peter Siegelman,
Contributory Disparate Impacts in Employment Discrimination Law, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 515, 550-51 (2007).
207 See Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate
Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305, 374
n.329 (1983) ("It is often difficult to predict the outcome of a challenge to the validity of a
selection device because judicial assessments of the adequacy of validation studies may be
very complex."); cf Julia Lamber, Discretionary Decisionmaking: The Application of Title
VII's Disparate Impact Theory, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 869, 905 (1985) ("[A] court should
consider the facts then before it in terms of the disparate impact theory. A contrary action
would exalt the form of the cause of action over the substance of the complaint." (footnote
omitted)).
208 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) (stating that a motion for summary judgment is to be
granted when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law").
209 See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-
1607.14 (2009).
2211
HeinOnline  -- 90 B.U. L. Rev. 2211 2010
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
been done.210 Under the affirmative-defense reading, however, the Court
suggested that New Haven would be entitled to the benefit of the defense,
emphasizing the extent to which the test designer tried to ensure that the test
would reasonably measure the skills needed by firefighters in New Haven. 211
Thus, employers might no longer even need a validation study to overcome a
showing of disparate impact. This development, which is inconsistent with at
least the tenor of the Uniform Guidelines,2 12 would be a profound change for
disparate-impact litigation.213 And this change would be particularly beneficial
to employers, which often expend a great deal of time and money in procuring
these formal studies. 214
C. Variations on the Affirmative Defense
The premise in this part of the Article has been that Ricci's coda suggests a
doctrinally meaningful affirmative defense for disparate-impact cases.
Therefore, in deriving its elements, we have aimed to avoid terms that would
make the defense either trivial or render superfluous Title VII's provisions on
disparate-impact liability. Those choices led to how we defined the contours
of the possible defense described above.
But it certainly would be possible to make other choices that would either
strengthen or weaken the defense. For example, we have described the defense
as essentially subjective - about what the employer in fact knew, not what it
should have known. Alternatively, the defense could be purely objective. This
would require the employer to show that at the time it used the test, it could not
have known about the test's unlawful disparate impact.
This objective variation would render the affirmative defense largely trivial.
Except in very unusual cases, asking what the employer could have known
about unlawful disparate impact at the time it used the test will be the same as
asking whether the test in fact has an unlawful disparate impact. That is
because normally when a test has an unlawful disparate impact, careful enough
study of the test would reveal that impact, and the impact does not change over
time. Thus, this variation would require the employer to prove that the test did
210 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 154-56 (D. Conn. 2006) (assuming that
no formal validation study had been done), affd, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam),
rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
211 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678 ("IOS devised the written examinations, which were the
focus of the CSB's inquiry, after painstaking analyses of the captain and lieutenant positions
- analyses in which IOS made sure that minorities were overrepresented.").
212 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1(B) (stating that employers need not "conduct validity
studies of selection procedures where no adverse impact results," suggesting that they must
do so where there is an adverse impact (emphasis added)).
213 See Belton, supra note 64, at 232 (discussing the use of validation studies in
disparate-impact cases); Yellen, supra note 205, at 749 (observing that in deciding questions
of job-relatedness, courts usually look to validation studies).
214 See Belton, supra note 64, at 232; Yellen, supra note 205, at 749-50.
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not have unlawful disparate impact - not much of an affirmative defense, as it
simply amounts to disproving the plaintiff s case.
Another variation that has the opposite effect would drop our requirement
that the employer make some sort of inquiry into the test's validity. In this
variation, good-faith ignorance by the employer would be enough. But as we
noted earlier, this would essentially eviscerate disparate impact as a separate
theory of discrimination, because the doctrine's foundational principle is that
an employer can be liable for discriminatory results despite its good faith.
Similarly, one could try to drop the requirement that the employer have had
evidence of the test's statistical disparity on a minority group before using the
test. But this variation is less firmly moored to the concerns that prompted the
Ricci Court to make the observation that led to the affirmative defense. 215 The
defense ultimately seeks to capture whether the employer would have been
liable as a matter of disparate treatment for discarding the test, and it is
unlikely that the employer could have intended to engage in racial (or similar
group-based) discrimination if it had not been aware of the racial consequences
of discarding the exam.
Ultimately, we reject these variations not because they are impossible or
even implausible, but because they do not offer a reading of Ricci that gives
real meaning both to the cryptic passage at the end and to the statutory
provisions governing disparate impact.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
If accepted by the courts, the Ricci affirmative defense would represent a
profound change for disparate-impact theory. An employer would now be able
to defend against a claim of disparate impact by showing that at the time it
took the challenged employment action, it knew that the test adversely affected
a protected minority group but nonetheless did not believe that the test had an
unlawful disparate impact. 216 Thus, for the first time in disparate-impact law,
the employer's state of mind would be relevant to the analysis. 217 Before
Ricci, disparate-impact claims turned solely on objective circumstances:
whether there was a disparity in pass rates, whether the test in fact predicted
job performance, and whether there was an equally effective alternative with
less impact. 218 Now the claims would also turn on what the employer knew
and what conclusions it drew. 219
215 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681 (addressing the inherent tension between the "competing
expectations under the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions" of Title VII).
216 See supra Part IV (discussing the Ricci affirmative defense).
217 See supra Part I (discussing the role of disparate impact as a theory of unintentional
discrimination).
218 See supra Part I.
219 See supra Part IV.
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This would bring disparate-impact analysis closer to disparate-treatment
analysis, which always has turned on the employer's subjective motivation.220
In theory, an employer could fail to establish the affirmative defense even if it
harbored no discriminatory motive. But perhaps in practice, absent a
discriminatory motive, few employers large enough to be covered by Title
V11 22 1 would choose to use a test that they know to have a disparate impact on
minorities without also having some basis to believe that the test is job-related.
An employer that uses a test it knows not to be job-related, and that has a
disparate impact on a minority group may well be using the test as a pretext to
mask intentional discrimination, because it is difficult to imagine another
reason that the employer would stick with a discriminatory examination.
Some have long seen disparate impact's primary purpose as smoking out
intentional discrimination where it would be hard to prove motive through
other means. 222 As noted earlier, this approach conceives of disparate-impact
analysis as primarily an evidentiary framework, akin to the McDonnell
Douglas framework for ordinary disparate-treatment claims, rather than a
separate substantive theory of liability. 223 Justice Scalia's concurrence in Ricci
alluded to this view, although he discounted it because employers cannot
defend a disparate-impact claim simply by disproving a discriminatory
220 See Cheryl L. Anderson, What Is "Because of the Disability" Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act? Reasonable Accommodation, Causation, and the Windfall Doctrine,
27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 323, 333 (2006) ("Cases proceeding on a disparate
treatment theory require proof of motive. Cases proceeding on a disparate impact theory do
not . . . ." (citation omitted)); Braceras, supra note 28, at 1140; George Rutherglen,
Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept of Equality, 74
FORDHAM L. REv. 2313, 2328 (2006).
221 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2006) ("The term 'employer' means a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in
each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . . ."); Jeffrey
A. Mandell, Comment, The Procedural Posture of Minimum Employee Thresholds in
Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 1047, 1047-77 (2005).
222 Braceras, supra note 28, at 1167 ("Claims that the disparate impact model should be
applied to high-stakes educational assessments in order to smoke out covert intentional
discrimination have their roots in Professor George Rutherglen's 'objective theory of
discrimination.' According to this theory, the disparate impact model serves as a
mechanism for identifying intentional discrimination in the absence of direct evidence of
racial or ethnic animus." (footnote omitted)); Jolls, supra note 80, at 652; Jennifer L.
Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 779
(2009) (citing Primus, Round Three, supra note 80, at 518)); see also In re Emp't
Discrimination Litig. Against Ala., 198 F.3d 1305, 1321-23 (11th Cir. 1999).
223 See supra Part L.A-B; see also Seicshnaydre, supra note 25, at 1163-64 (observing
that some "theorists consider the proposition that disparate impact exists primarily to help
litigants uncover discriminatory motive that is lurking below the surface . . . . As
previously noted, this basis is framed by Professor Primus as 'evidentiary dragnet.' . . .
Disparate impact is thus conceived as a method of proof through which intent can be proven
indirectly." (citation omitted)).
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motive.224  And the Eleventh Circuit relied on this view to uphold the
abrogation of States' sovereign immunity from disparate-impact claims.225
A Ricci affirmative defense that protected everyone but the improperly
motivated or unreasonably ignorant employer could signal that the Supreme
Court subscribes to the smoking-out view of disparate impact. If the employer
has no reason to question a test's validity, then the employer likely has a
nondiscriminatory motive for using the test even if it disproportionately
harmed a protected minority. By contrast, the employer that sticks with a test
that has an adverse impact on minorities - even in the face of evidence
questioning the test's validity - is more likely to harbor a discriminatory
motive. This latest development, then, brings us back to the path the Supreme
Court seemed to be pursuing before the Civil Rights Act of 1991, when it
appeared poised to collapse the distinction between disparate treatment and
disparate impact.226
The Ricci affirmative defense also might be the final blow to disparate
impact as a viable litigation strategy for plaintiffs. The academic scholarship
has long lamented that disparate impact is an "underutilized" theory.227 Even
before Ricci, it was hard for plaintiffs to develop meritorious disparate-impact
claims.228 Plaintiffs needed to collect a great deal of data and subject that data
to rigorous statistical analysis just to determine if they had a prima facie
case.229 They then needed to do their own analysis of job-relatedness and
alternatives that would rebut whatever the employer might be expected to
proffer.230 Few plaintiffs were eager to take on these daunting tasks.231
224 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682-83 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
225 In re Emp't Discrimination Litig., 198 F.3d at 1321 ("Though the plaintiff is never
explicitly required to demonstrate discriminatory motive, a genuine finding of disparate
impact can be highly probative of the employer' s motive since a racial 'imbalance is often a
telltale sign of purposeful discrimination."' (citation omitted)).
226 See supra Part I.B.
227 Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What's
Griggs Still Good for? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 597 (2004); Sullivan, Looking
Past the Desert Palace Mirage, supra note 29, at 912-13.
228 Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1162 n.3
(1995) ("Because most individual employment decisions do not implicate identifiable
practices that can be shown to have a statistically significant disparate impact on members
of a protected group, very few Title VII cases are actually amenable to disparate impact
treatment."); see also Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 CoLUM. L. REv. 374,
376 (2007); Sullivan, Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, supra note 29, at 9 12-13.
229 Seiner, supra note 15, at 116; Sullivan, Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, supra
note 29, at 993.
230 See supra Part I.
231 See Shoben, supra note 227, at 600.
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The affirmative defense would add a whole new layer of analysis to what
was already a complicated back-and-forth burden-shifting framework. 232 And
even though injunctive relief may remain available to plaintiffs who prove the
rest of their case, defendants that successfully availed themselves of the
affirmative defense would have taken away the retrospective remedies
plaintiffs are likely to want most - instatement to the position and back pay.233
By further increasing the complication of proving a disparate-impact claim and
reducing the potential payoff for success, the Ricci affirmative defense could
make it even less likely that plaintiffs will consider bringing disparate-impact
claims.
But the new affirmative defense would not necessarily mean that there
would be more discrimination by employers. Even if fewer disparate-impact
claims are brought in court, the affirmative defense could in theory create
positive incentives that encourage employers to avoid committing disparate-
impact discrimination in the first place. In this respect, a Ricci defense would
resemble two other nontextual affirmative defenses for employers that the
Court has created under Title VII - one for employers facing claims of
unlawful harassment and the other for employers facing liability for punitive
damages. In both instances the Court has tried to shape parties' incentives by
developing rules based on the policies behind Title VII rather than the statutory
language itself.
The Court created the harassment defense first. Title VII outlaws
discrimination that creates a hostile work environment, such as severe or
pervasive sexual harassment. 234  In Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth235 and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,236 the Supreme Court created a standard for
determining when an employer is liable for harassment of an employee by a
supervisor. 237 When the harassment culminates in a tangible employment
action such as a firing or demotion, the Court held, the employer is vicariously
liable for the acts of its supervisor. 238 But when the pattern of harassment does
not involve any tangible employment actions, the Court created an affirmative
defense to the employer's vicarious liability. 23 9 The employer must show that
(1) it exercised reasonable care to prevent or correct supervisory harassment,
232 See supra Part I.
233 See supra Part I.C.
234 E.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
235 524 U.S. 742, 754-65 (1998).
236 524 U.S. 775, 790-808 (1998).
237 Scott A. Moss, Fighting Discrimination While Fighting Litigation: A Tale of Two
Supreme Courts, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 981, 987-88 (2007); see also Stephen F. Befort &
Sarah J. Gorajski, When Quitting Is Fitting: The Need for a Reformulated Sexual
Harassment/Constructive Discharge Standard in the Wake of Pennsylvania State Police v.
Suders, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 593, 609 (2006).
238 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753-54; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790.
239 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
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such as by developing a workplace harassment policy, and (2) the employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of opportunities to avoid the harm by,
for example, failing to report it to higher-up supervisors.240 This defense was
intended to encourage both employers and employees to resolve workplace
harassment promptly and as an internal matter, without requiring the courts to
intervene. 24' And it provides employers that take reasonable measures to
prevent harassment with some protection against liability even if the measures
prove inadequate: an employee who unreasonably bypasses those measures
will be unable to collect damages. 242
The Court relied on similar policies to create an affirmative defense to
employers' liability for punitive damages. 243 The Civil Rights Act of 1991
added damages as a possible remedy for a Title VII violation.244 The statute
allows punitive damages when the plaintiff shows that the employer engaged
in intentional discrimination "with malice or with reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual."245 But in Kolstad v.
American Dental Ass'n,246 the Court held that even when the plaintiff has met
this standard, the employer may avoid liability if it shows that it engaged in
"good faith efforts at Title VII compliance," such as taking steps to implement
240 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
241 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The defense may not have
achieved its intended effect, however. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The
Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REv. 859, 885 (2008) ("Far
from solving the problems created by Title VII's prompt complaint requirements, the added
layer of internal processes creates additional risks for employees."); Susan Sturm, Second
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458,
537-38 (2001) ("[U]ncritical acceptance of internal dispute resolution processes legitimates
purely formalistic solutions, and it will often leave underlying patterns and conditions
unchanged.").
242 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07; Anne Lawton, The
Emperor's New Clothes: How the Academy Deals with Sexual Harassment, 11 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 75, 108 (1999); Moss, supra note 237, at 987.
243 See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of
Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 4 n.2 (2003)
("In Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, the Court supplemented the rules in Faragher and
Ellerth by deciding that punitive damages could not be imposed against employers that have
made good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII."); Scott A. Moss & Peter H. Huang, How
the New Economics Can Improve Employment Discrimination Law, and How Economics
Can Survive the Demise of the 'Rational Actor,' 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 183, 247 (2009)
("Although technically distinct, 'in practice' there is substantial overlap between what does
and does not suffice for the Faragher/Ellerth defense to harassment liability (based on an
effective antiharassment program) and the Kolstad defense to punitive damages (based on
good faith Title VII compliance)." (citing Bettina B. Plevan, Training and Other Techniques
to Address Complaints of Harassment, 682 PLI/LIT 675, 755 (2002))).
244 See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 533-34 (1999).
245 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2006).
246 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
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an antidiscrimination policy. 247 Without this affirmative defense, according to
the Court, the fear of punitive damages would discourage employers from
educating themselves and their managers about Title VII's requirements so as
to avoid the risk of deliberately disregarding those requirements. 248  To
neutralize these "perverse incentives," the Court created an affirmative defense
that would do the opposite by encouraging employers to educate themselves
and their managers about Title VII's requirements. 2 49  This policy was
designed to head off some employment-discrimination problems before they
reach litigation. 250
The Ricci affirmative defense similarly would encourage employers to take
reasonable steps in advance of litigation to head off possible Title VII
violations - by, for example, carefully examining the validity of an
employment test for unlawful disparate impact before using it.2 51 If that
examination reveals flaws in the test, the employer will be able to fix them
before any employee is harmed, and thus the affirmative defense could prevent
some instances of unlawful disparate impact. And if the examination does not
reveal flaws, the employer may be protected from liability for decisions that
rely on that test until contrary information is brought to the employer's
attention.252
To a large extent, employers already had this incentive, because under pre-
Ricci law they would have been strictly liable for flawed tests that ultimately
were shown to have a disparate impact.253 A prudent employer would have
carefully examined its tests even without the availability of an additional
affirmative defense that depended on its having done so.
But apart from the incentive to examine a test's validity, the defense as we
have described it would give employers an additional incentive to collect and
examine the statistical effects of its tests on minority groups before using them.
While an employer would not necessarily have to abandon a test that adversely
affected a group - indeed, under Ricci's primary holding, the employer might
not be able to do so - this inquiry would at least make the effects transparent to
the employer. Over the long run, inquiries like this might encourage
employers to replace practices that have an unnecessarily large impact on some
with practices that ensure a more even playing field.
The Ricci defense also would shape the incentives of employees.
Employees who have concerns about a test's validity would need to bring
247 Id. at 544-45.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 545.
250 See Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of
Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in
Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 15 (2001).
251 See supra Part IV.
252 See supra Part IV.
253 See supra Part I.
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those concerns to the employer's attention before it is used as a selection
device for an employment decision. If they failed to do so, their potential
remedies might be severely curtailed - they may be able to obtain an injunction
barring continued use of the test, but they may not be able to obtain back pay,
instatement, or any other retrospective remedy. 254 Like sexual harassment law,
then, in certain circumstances the Ricci affirmative defense would place an
obligation on the employee to make the employer aware of the problem.255
But the analogy goes only so far. In the context of sexual harassment,
employees on the ground are likely to have better information than
management about what is happening in the workplace, and therefore
encouraging reporting by employees is likely to reduce discrimination. Here,
by contrast, it seems unlikely that employees will be in a better position than
the employer to evaluate the disparate impact of the employer's tests. One
therefore would not expect to see a Ricci affirmative defense reduce workplace
discrimination nearly to the extent that the Ellerth-Faragher one might, and by
immunizing more employer conduct it in fact might have the opposite effect.
Moreover, the Ellerth-Faragher and Kolstad defenses arise in the context of
an employer's vicarious liability for the acts of its agents, and the Supreme
Court expressly grounded its analysis in background principles of agency
law. 256 The Ricci defense, by contrast, does not appear to stem from any
general principle of common law or statutory interpretation. There is no
general rule immunizing civil defendants from liability when they reasonably
but mistakenly believed their actions were legal. To the contrary, although
statutes occasionally provide an express defense for bona fide errors, 257
defendants generally are liable for statutory violations even when they had
good reason to think their conduct was lawful.258 The Ricci defense, however,
254 See supra Part IV.
255 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806-07 (1998); supra Part IV.
256 Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 544 (1999) ("Holding employers liable
for punitive damages when they engage in good faith efforts to comply with Title VII,
however, is in some tension with the very principles underlying common law limitations on
vicarious liability for punitive damages . . . ."); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754 ("We turn to
principles of agency law, for the term 'employer' is defined under Title VII to include
'agents."'); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802 ("We therefore agree with Faragher that in
implementing Title VII it makes sense to hold an employer vicariously liable for some
tortious conduct of a supervisor made possible by abuse of his supervisory authority, and
that the aided-by-agency-relation principle embodied in § 219(2)(d) of the Restatement
provides an appropriate starting point for determining liability for the kind of harassment
presented here.").
257 See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2006) ("A debt
collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this subchapter if the debt
collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and
resulted from a bona fide error . . . .").
258 See, e.g., Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 537 (recognizing that there may be instances where an
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would immunize employers merely because they thought their conduct was
lawful, even though disparate impact is a doctrine primarily aimed at
unintentional conduct.259 This is a reason to question whether the affirmative-
defense reading of Ricci is the best one.
Although we are not addressing Ricci's constitutional implications here, one
further consequence of the affirmative-defense reading deserves attention. A
defense of this sort would narrow the doctrine of disparate impact and might
thereby bolster arguments for the doctrine's constitutionality. Justice Scalia's
chief concern about disparate impact's constitutionality in Ricci was that it
goes far beyond merely smoking out evidence of hidden intentional
discrimination. 260 But the defense as we have described it would make it
easier to characterize the doctrine in such a fashion. Of course, the fact that
Justice Scalia continued to see serious constitutional issues in Ricci is another
reason to question the affirmative-defense reading of the majority's opinion.
By focusing on Ricci's doctrinal implications for disparate-impact analysis
as a statutory matter, this Article fills a gap in the emerging academic literature
on Ricci, which so far has focused on other noteworthy aspects of the case.
For example, Richard Primus's article The Future of Disparate Impact261
examines Ricci's constitutional implications. Professor Primus argues that the
Court's ruling appears to treat disparate impact as an inherently race-conscious
theory that therefore is vulnerable to constitutional challenge under the Equal
Protection Clause.262 He also offers narrower ways to read Ricci that would
help disparate impact survive constitutional challenge at least in the majority of
cases. 263 But because his focus is on the constitutional questions, Professor
Primus does not address Ricci's statement that New Haven would have had a
defense to a disparate-impact lawsuit, and he does not consider what effect this
statement may have on disparate-impact analysis. We complement his
approach by putting the constitutional questions to the side and focusing on the
doctrinal implications.
We also complement Michael Zimmer's approach in his recent article
Ricci's Color-Blind Standard in a Race Conscious Society: A Case of
Unintended Consequences?264 Professor Zimmer primarily looks at Ricci's
implications for future disparate-treatment claims, focusing on the Court's
employer unlawfully discriminates "with the distinct belief that its discrimination is
lawful").
259 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006) (contrasting "unlawful intentional discrimination"
with "an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact"); § 2000e-
2(k)(2) (clarifying that the business-necessity defense for disparate-impact claims "may not
be used as a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination"); supra Part I.
260 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
261 Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, supra note 9, at 1342-43.
262 Id. at 1344.
263 Id.
264 See Zimmer, supra note 9.
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analysis of intent.265 He argues that the Court has lowered the bar considerably
for plaintiffs by allowing them to rely merely on proof that the employer knew
the racial consequences of its actions, except during the design phase of an
employment practice.266 While Professor Zimmer notes in passing the part of
the Court's opinion that we analyze here, he does not seek to make sense of it
in detail, stating only that it is "inscrutable" and "obscure."267
Charles Sullivan has also recently written on the impact of the Ricci
decision on employment discrimination cases. 268 In his article, Professor
Sullivan discusses the intersection between disparate-impact and disparate-
treatment theory after Ricci.26 9 While his focus is on several other interesting
aspects of the case, he notes the language that we identify as constituting an
affirmative defense in this article, and he correctly suggests that this language
"confus[es] things" and "makes sense only when read in the context of the rest
of the opinion." 270 But because his article primarily deals with other questions
raised by Ricci, Professor Sullivan does not offer a full account of what this
language might mean doctrinally for future disparate-impact litigation. This
Article takes that additional step, explaining that the confusing language, in the
context of the entire opinion, can be read as a broad-based affirmative defense
that is now available to all employers.271 Professors Zimmer and Sullivan also
correctly identify the difficulty of applying this language to the facts of the
disparate impact case that was recently brought by the black firefighters
against the City (and was subsequently dismissed by the district court).272 As
we discuss above, these issues may extend beyond the facts of that case, and
could be implicated in most future disparate-impact claims.
CONCLUSION
The Ricci case has been a source of significant controversy and is sure to
generate even greater debate as the lower courts struggle with how to apply it.
This Article provides a look at one aspect of the case that has thus far not been
examined by the scholarship - the possibility that Ricci created a new
affirmative defense to disparate-impact liability. This possible affirmative
265 Id. at 9.
266 Id. at 24.
267 Id. at 28, 30.
268 See generally Sullivan, End of the Line, supra note 160.
269 Id. at 212-13.
270 Id.
271 See supra Part V.
272 Zimmer, supra note 9, at 23-27; Sullivan, End of the Line, supra note 160, at 213-14.
Professor Sullivan notes the implications of the disparate impact suit brought by the black
firefighters, discusses the civil procedure concerns, and addresses the possible impact of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. Id. See also Briscoe v. New Haven, No. 3:09-cv-01642 (CSH),
2010 WL 2794231, at *2 (D. Conn. July 12, 2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-1975 (2d Cir.
Sept. 27, 2010).
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defense would provide a form of qualified immunity for employers and, if
accepted by the courts, could prove to be the end of disparate impact as a
viable litigation strategy for plaintiffs. Although there are other ways to read
Ricci that do not involve such a dramatic change to existing doctrine, all of
them have weaknesses as well. Ultimately, the courts will have to decide how
seriously to take the cryptic language from Ricci.
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